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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
Implications of advances in science and technology
In preparation for the 8th Review Conference a meeting was convened in Warsaw in September 
2015 to identify and discuss Trends in Science and Technology Relevant to the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention. The conference noted many issues of relevance to the Review 
Conference and reached several overarching conclusions. 
The meeting concluded that:
•	 Technological barriers to acquiring and using a 
biological weapon have been significantly eroded 
since the Seventh Review Conference. There had 
been no further developments that could enable 
novel activities inconsistent with the aims and 
objectives of the BWC. 
•	 Likewise, there were no developments that would  
not be covered by the treaty or additional 
supplementary understandings, but 
•	 The speed at which the life sciences and  
technology are advancing, and the rate of 
convergence of disciplines, is still accelerating.  
This increases the likelihood of such developments  
in the foreseeable future. 
•	 Such potential problems, as well as any appropriate 
responses could be discussed prior to the 9th  
Review Conference.
•	 Biotechnology is increasingly important around 
the world as a manufacturing technology and has 
therefore become a potential target for biological 
weapons itself. 
•	 It should be explored whether there are any risks 
not already captured by existing treaties and laws of 
weapons that cause damage to equipment, supplies, 
or material associated with the bio-economy. 
•	 There was an increased need for education and 
outreach to promote the aims and objectives of the 
BWC amongst the scientific community. 
The biosciences are developing at an  
unprecedented rate
The rate and scale of progress in the life sciences and 
biotechnology continues to grow rapidly. There is an 
increasing diffusion of knowledge around the world  
and more interconnection between knowledge hubs, 
many of them ‘virtual’. Laboratories operate in more 
diverse geographic locations and across different 
sectors of our societies. 
The character of life sciences and biotechnology is 
evolving with greater focus on rational design, biological 
engineering, and more flexible production. Moving 
from ‘concept’ to ‘application’ is becoming ever simpler, 
unlocking further potential for progress. All these factors 
have both positive and negative implications for the BWC.
The BWC should continue to monitor these 
developments
For this reason, the BWC should continue to ensure that 
such developments are not used in prohibited activities, 
whilst facilitating their use for peaceful purposes. It could 
achieve this by devising an effective, on-going, and 
suitably resourced mechanism to: 
•	 Develop specific questions that can be answered 
through an on-going review of developments in 
science and technology; 
•	 Identify current scientific and technical capabilities 
applicable to these questions; 
•	 Consider the implications of those developments in 
the context of the BWC; and 
•	 Formulating informed decisions about any further 
actions that may be required.
An approach for systematically assessing the risk of 
new scientific developments to the BWC would greatly 
assist in this process.
The global ability to detect and treat disease has  
been enhanced
One positive outcome of developments since the  
Seventh Review Conference is that our collective 
capacity to combat disease has markedly improved, 
regardless of whether the outbreak is naturally occurring 
or the result of a malevolent act. Whilst remaining logistic, 
economic and technical barriers are to be surmounted, 
the conference noted that it should now be possible 
to assemble patchwork capabilities into a diffuse but 
integrated system for countering global or local outbreaks. 
Such a system could scale from local needs through 
to international responses. A structure that enabled 
data, such as pathogen sequences, to be shared 
more effectively and efficiently would facilitate a rapid 
and effective response. As expertise and ‘know-how’ 
matures, opportunities for technological leapfrogging 
appear, as was the case with mobile communication 
systems. Developing countries can then access 
opportunities and capabilities in the field that match, if 
not surpass, those found in developed countries.
Increasing ‘digitization’ of pathogen data enables the 
identification and characterisation of the infectious agent 
by centralised facilities, facilitating the development of 
countermeasures and the use of ‘distributed diagnostics’ 
at the site of the outbreak. This concept has already been 
partially implemented in both developed and developing 
countries. The conference noted a pressing need for more 
comprehensive sets of baseline and reference pathogen 
data. ‘Microbial forensics’ can be used to help establish 
attribution if a malevolent deployment is suspected.
Vaccines and drugs can now be developed more 
rapidly than ever before. Lead times can be reduced 
through rapid detection and characterisation of 
outbreaks. The design, testing and optimisation of 
vaccines and drugs have been streamlined using 
better computational technologies, modelling tools 
and platform technologies although provision of 
bioinformatics capabilities remains challenging.
Outsourcing of key production steps has reduced the 
need for dedicated vaccine production infrastructure, 
and the distance a product has to travel to its point of 
use. It is increasingly simpler, faster and cheaper to 
industrialize production processes. Single-use equipment 
and modular production technologies shorten turn-
around times. However, regulatory and liability issues 
associated with diagnostics, drugs and vaccines in health 
emergencies continue to limit potential for progress and 
this is an issue that should be addressed.
Recent advances have also facilitated the development 
of biological weapons
Recent advances could also facilitate almost every step 
of a biological weapons programme, and technological 
barriers to acquiring and using a biological weapon 
have been conspicuously eroded since the Seventh 
Review Conference. 
Both novel and traditional approaches continue to  
offer opportunities for acquiring an agent from nature. 
The sometimes-formidable challenges associated with 
the synthesis of existing agents and the development  
of novel agents have been overcome in some cases 
by using gene transfer and other biosynthetic 
engineering approaches. 
Modification of biological agents enables them to be 
more easily optimized for specific purposes, a capability 
that could be applied for use in developing a biological 
weapon. Developments in scale-up and production 
technologies have changed production signatures.  
Less space and time are needed, narrowing windows 
for interdiction. 
Although these trends diminish the need for stockpiling, 
the proliferation of (e.g.) freeze-drying capacity has 
actually reduced the space required to store biological 
weapons. It is also now easier to deliver a biological 
agent given advances in areas such as nanoparticles 
and sophisticated modelling of dispersal patterns using 
the techniques of aerobiology.
Many of these advances are at the leading edge of 
current capabilities. They are expensive and complicated 
to acquire and to deploy successfully. Making use of them 
for prohibited purposes would probably currently require 
the resources of a state but this situation may change in 
the future, reinforcing the need for on-going efforts to 
review relevant developments in science and technology.
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